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Two Essays on Language and Power from the CR in Inner Mongolia
Essay One
Saying Sorry in the Cultural
Revolution in Inner Mongolia
Talk on 6 September to the Annual Meeting of the British Association of Japanese and Chinese Studies, Leeds.
In this talk I look at self-criticisms produced by Teng Haiqing, the commander appointed by the Central government in Beijing in the Inner Mongolian area of China in early 1967, during the period when he was being removed from power in mid 1969. I show the means by which this was signified in the language he used, and how this reflects the context in which he spoke. A critical part of this is the speech act of saying `sorry' and the attempt to do so in an environment where the most sensitive issue and the main source of grievance to the local population, the suffering of an ethnic minority, was largely unarticulated.
The History
The Cultural Revolution in IMAR, because of the region's particular geographical location and ethnic composition, took a unique course, exacerbating unresolved tensions between ethno-political groups. It culminated in a bloody conflict which resulted in the loss of over 16,000 lives from 1967 to 1969.
The movement started with an attack on the local Party secretary, Ulanfu (a Mongolian) from May to June in 1966 at a meeting in Beijing. He was dismissed from his post the following month. In 1967, an IM CR Standing Committee was set up as a result of discussions in Beijing between Party leaders and key local groups. The deputy commander of the Beijing Military District, Teng Haiqing, was brought in to head this and the Military Region. In effect Teng became the leading power-holder in the region during the early to middle CR period.
Who was Teng Haiqing?
Teng Haiqing was a native of Anhui province. He had joined the Red Army in 1930, working under Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping as commander of the political division in the Third Field Army during the Civil War in the 1940s. He had then studied at Nanjing Military College for five years from 1949, before being made a Lieutenant General in 1955 and moving to Shijiazhuang in Hebei Province to be the principal of the advanced infantry academy. In 1961 he was made Deputy Commander of the Beijing Military District before being despatched to IMAR as a result of a central government decision in 1967 to deal with the increasing instability in the region and impose greater control there.
Teng differed from Ulanfu not just because he was an outsider to IMAR, but also because he was ethnically Han. Being an outsider meant that Teng was able to start from a clean sheet in the region. But it also meant that he was placed in an area in which he had no background or power-base. His influence locally derived from two things: support from the central government, and from his being an army-man, able to call on the networks and factions that they had operating in IM.
Teng mainly exercised his power through the new administrative positions created to implement the CR: the CR Military District (the position to which he was appointed by the Centre on 16th April 1967), the IMAR Preparatory Commission (set up in June 1967); the IMAR Cultural Revolutionary Committee, set up in November, and the Central IMAR CRC Nucleus Group, set up in February 1968.
IM 1967-1969
In the two years from April 1967, when Teng went to IM, he was in charge of a situation that became increasingly unstable and dangerous. Part of this derived from the power vacuum caused by the leadership battles being waged in Beijing. But the impact of these in an area like IM was affected by the fact that there was a unique element there - the existence of a politically significant minority of Mongolians, who were seen, during the paranoid environment of the CR, as pursuing their own separatist agenda, attempting either to unify with the Republic of Mongolia to create a Pan Mongolian state, or worse, conspire with the USSR to join them. In the initial phase of Teng's time in IM, he was largely ignorant of these undercurrents. The main campaigns in 1967 into 1968 attacked Ulanfu and the Party members round him as revisionists, followers of the capitalist line, and supporters of the USSR and Liu Shaoqi within a framework supplied by the Centre in Beijing. But into 1968, the existence of a so called underground party, the Inner Mongolian People's Party, with a leadership, organisational structure and political programme became the main issue. An all-out purge of cadres and ordinary people of Mongolian ethnicity swept the region, effecting thousands of people, and resulting in a campaign that, while it was never waged in a discourse the terms of which declared too openly its ethnic basis, was in fact an ethnic purge.
General Context for the Fall of Teng
This period was terminated by the Ninth Party Congress, convened in Beijing in April 1969, the first for over 11 years. The impact of this Congress was dramatic. This derived from the issuing of a single utterance from Mao Zedong that `excesses had been committed in the course of the movement to rectify the Party' in IMAR, encapsulated in the `22nd May Directive' from the Centre that figured so prominently in IM literature. This judgement was repeatedly used in accusations against Teng that began to appear after May 1969. Teng's removal from power was most clearly signified by his physically leaving the region in December 1969, for re-education in Tangshan, Hebei province. The PLA 65th Corps was sent from the Beijing Military Region to control what was left of IMAR.
Teng's `Confessions? From Demand to Apology
During the period of the purges in 1968 and early 1969 Teng had spoken at large events and meetings with cadres. He was clearly the main public director of the CR locally, and presented as the disseminator of Central instructions. His tone was prescriptive. He promoted the central ideology which asserted the hegemony of social classification according to class, in opposition to any other expression of social identity (in particular that based on ethnicity). But after the Ninth Party Congress his language underwent a dramatic change, dominated by apology and admissions of culpability. In 1968, Teng delivered orders to organisations and units of every size and variety in IMAR, and spoke directly on behalf of the Centre as its mouthpiece and main representative. On 14 April 1968, he could say this:
`We must seize power till we are completely victorious. IMAR has so many traitors, spies, cow ghosts and snake spirits, bastards - our rebellion factions have a small number of bad people?For whom does Bai Mingjie's rebellious faction rebel? For whom does Zhang Zhipeng's rebellious faction rebel? They are carrying out counter-revolutionary activities. How can we put up with them not distinguishing between us and the enemy? How can that be OK? We revolutionaries need to take the path of socialism. Are they taking the path of socialism? They are carrying out capitalist power-restoration. How can we get together with enemies [like this]?'
But by 14th June 1969 he was reduced to this:
`Comrades?My mistakes are very serious?I have committed crimes against the people, and harmed them, and towards Chairman Mao. To him I plead guilty (qingzui). Those comrades labelled as IMPP include many old people who have lost their sons and daughters, many young people who have lost their wives and husbands, many children who have lost their fathers and mothers. I am the guiltiest in making these great mistakes?I have let down (duibuiqi) these comrades, let down Chairman Mao, let down the 13 million people of IMAR, let down the revolutionary people of all nationality backgrounds.?'
The removal of support at the Centre meant that the value of Teng' words in the new market had decreased. This was compounded by the organisational changes that had occurred ? The setting up of a new institution, signifying new power priorities and objectives, accommodating admissions of mistakes made in the previous order. This affected the illocutionary force of Teng's words. He spoke to different groups, with different objectives and sanction. The context in which he had exercised power had changed, and his new voice was partly brought on by a need to renegotiate in this new situation. The sort of power he exercised now was therefore affected by the national and local context. In fact, this is paradigmatic of the journey of many leaders temporarily empowered during the CR, and then left to take the flack when the movement was judged flawed, and the co-ordinates of it adjusted.
Teng's Mistakes and Crimes: The Basis for Denunciation
The Ninth Party Congress had in fact created a new narrative of the CR. In this, Teng's role changed from a power holder, to one of someone accused of not understanding the situation in IMAR and being an outsider. An attack in May 1969 produced by a local rebellious group declared that:
`Teng Haiqing doesn't understand the real situation in IMAR, he doesn't start out from how things really are in IMAR, he doesn't investigate, doesn't research and objectify, but is happy to exaggerate the enemy feelings (diqing) and view IMAR as a black nest, countering the high hopes of Chairman Mao towards the 13 million people of IMAR.?'
The area where Teng was accused of committing crimes rather than merely making mistakes was to have 'not had the Centre in his eyes.?`He cheated the Centre,?the attack continued, `and suppressed the people, trying to set up Teng's independent kingdom.?This is historical proof. Comrade Teng Haiqing was guilty. We must criticise Comrade Teng Haiqing's mistakes, [but] we must thoroughly rectify Comrade Teng Haiqing's leftist?opportunism crimes (zuixing).?nbsp; In his speeches in 1967-68 Teng had started off following the Centre's ideology closely, using its discourse. But the articulation of a unique aspect to the struggle in IMAR, the IMPP, had brought conflict and problems. In the material condemning him this was cited as the failure to understand the Centre's prescriptions about how to handle the problem in IMAR.
Nationality: The Breaking Point
The greatest problem that Teng had to address in the new discourse was how to admit that the brunt of the purge of the IMPP had been borne by Mongolians, and how to allocate blame for this without implicating the central government. The easiest solution was to make Teng into a fall guy. He was accused in some local attacks of stating in a speech that `the targets for the development of the IMPP were cadres of Mongolian nationality, and students, in both large and small schools. The other was working people. Another attack said that `Regarding the problem of national minorities, Teng Haiqing took the chance given him by the dig the IMPP to purge the national minority cadres, thinking that they were unreliable. He labelled a large number of them IMPP, forbade the use of their languages, and didn't respect their characteristics, seriously against the Party's policies on national minorities, destroying the unity between nationality groups.?
Teng admitted in his self-criticism on 23rd June that `in some work units 80% of those who were national minorities were labelled as IMPP. But neither Teng, nor his accusers in these documents, spoke of the IMPP purge being mostly aimed at, and suffered by, Mongolians. Both are located in the broadest context of treatment of `minorities.?
This was a great symbolic moment, marking the discourse off as very different from what had preceded it. The strategy adopted from April 1967 by Teng and his new administration, while intending to manage the problems in IMAR, had in fact caused them to spiral out of control, with violence reaching unacceptable levels. The central issue of the assertion of the hegemony of class over national minority terms, however, was not conceded or softened. The new discourse still sought to exercise control, and was an indication of the realisation that the best route to this was to concede the suffering of Mongolians. But there was no movement to interrogate why this group in particular had suffered, and question the ideological terms which had been dominant while this suffering had happened.
Keywords: `Rectify' and `Sorry'
Particular keywords in the previous stages of the CR in IMAR had delineated the main territory for contention between competing forces. In 1967, `people' and `power' were at the forefront, within a discourse aimed at aggressive central management of IMAR, tightly defining the constituencies there. `Class?and `nationality' dominated the central period, highlighting the identification and demonisation of what was claimed to be a local `counter-party?representing the dominance of the hegemony of ethnic over class identity. But in the terminal phase of the CR, the keywords became ones indicating the strategic points to regain control in a situation that had got out of hand. Here `pacifying',`admission of mistakes',`apology,' and `rectification' were central, achieved and implemented by organisational processes of mass- and self-criticism, and conveyed in a register of submissiveness.
The other keyword in this discourse was `sorry'. By necessity, Teng was the key performer of that term. Clustered around its performance were the issues of for whom Teng was saying sorry (himself, or the Centre he had represented till then), why he was saying sorry (to fully repudiate a form of power that had failed, or to serve as a fall-guy for the Centre, which could continue to exercise power in the area once he had taken the flack for them), and to whom he was saying sorry (the `people' of IMAR? The national minorities, the broad masses of the people, the leaders, the `wounded', and finally how he said sorry (the form of words he used, the way they were issued, his performance of them). Teng's very utterance of the term `sorry' distilled critical issues of the relationship between the exercise of power in the CR and language. It showed how someone who once issued orders, prescriptions and demands was placed in a position where they had to request forgiveness (leaving aside the kind of forgiveness this actually was) from their audience or constituency. Teng's apology served many functions, and proved to be a rich speech act.
There was the important issue of general context. In his self-criticisms Teng was clearly stated as performing an `examination' (jiancha). This draws on a history of CCP discipline, and was a genre that had a 40 year pedigree in the CCP. It was, in fact, one among several methods used by the CCP (including struggle sessions, mass criticism rallies, the writing of self-confessions). While some of these were adopted for use in the CR, they were not invented then but existed before. This had been well documented. Yang Jiang in her novel about the 1954 `four clear-ups' campaign (the first large-scale campaign waged against intellectuals after 1949) vividly described public meetings at which such examinations were undertaken. The most striking feature of the CR version of such `examinations' however, was the frequency in which they descended into violence and the lack of safeguards from this. According to a Mainland historian of the CR in IMAR, Wu Di, Teng was physically attacked at some of these meetings by those he had caused so much suffering to. In one case a mother simply handed her recently born child to him and demanded that he rear it as the father had been killed in the IMPP purge.
As in the genealogy that gave rise to the specific cultures or power in the PRC, the history of confessions in CCP sheds light on these generic constraints in which Teng operated, and the ways in which certain styles of speaking were sanctioned and others excluded. Pamela Lubell抯 study of the CR argues that both the CCP and Nationalist used the legal tradition of `confessions' to demonstrate `generous leniency to the offender who confessed.' This politicisation of the legal practice of confession also drew on `the Confucian approach to self-rectification. Confession, Lubell states, while becoming `increasing public and coercive in its twentieth century political culture still facilitated the demonstration of benevolence on the part of the ruling authority, placing the latter in an enhanced moral light.' Seen in this framework, Teng was renegotiating with the Centre, in a manner and language which it legitimised and recognised. He spoke with his own voice, but in an imposed convention which both dictated what he had to say and signified obedience to an outside authority.
(Note: The roots of struggle sessions in the rectification campaign in Yanan carried out in 1942/3 was well documented in Apter and Saich 1994, especially 59-68 which deal with the anti-Wang Shiwei and Wang Ming campaign. These were prototypes of the later, larger scale CR sessions. Struggle sessions against the landlords were a common occurence in the land reform campaign launched immediately after the Communists came to power in 1949. Thurston 1987 described these in Chapter Four of her study of the ordeal of intellectuals in the CR, paying particular attention to the mass-session against Wang Guangmei, the wife of Liu Shaoqi (121-124). Excerpts from Wang Guangmei's interrogation record are contained in Schoenhals 1996a, 101-116.
Yang 1988. The second and third parts of this novel described several such struggle sessions, and the production of documents of self-criticism and confession by the participants.
Interview 17th April 2003.)
Starting to Say Sorry
As a speech act, apologising reveals much about Teng's new power status. Apologising signified a new attitude to his audience. It also reflected the fact that he was now placed in a context in which the value of his previous formal positions and the institutional support he appeared to have was replaced by one where he had to speak on his own, without claiming to represent the Centre.
Teng began his self-criticism on the 18th June thus:
`Comrades! Today, with the most anguished feelings, I come to examine all of the mistakes I have made to the people of all national groups in IMAR. My mistakes are very serious, I am resolved to change my serious errors. Recently, the revolutionary masses have undertaken criticism towards me, in every banner, city, village and all other places. In the recent period, perhaps 30 times, the great revolutionary masses have undertaken criticism towards me. This is the greatest care and support of the great revolutionary masses towards the CRC, and it is also politically the greatest education for me, and the greatest good and help. I am grateful from the depths of my heart, warmly welcoming the criticism and help of these comrades. I am resolved after examination to continue going among the masses, receiving their criticism and help, using practical means to rectify my serious mistakes.'
This was formulaic (using words like `my serious mistakes,'`I am resolved'. Proof for how formulaic it was can be found in the fact that very similar patterns were used in the opening of the examination a week later to a different audience on the 23rd June. The common structures and phrases between these versions hint at a generic language of apology, something rehearsed and prepared. In both examinations, Teng was undertaking a `performance', performing the speech act of apology. In speech acts, the very act of saying something is taken as fulfilling what is said as long as it meets certain performative criterion. In promising something, for instance, the saying of a promise is itself the act of promising. A criterion for this, and for the speech act of apologising, is that it should be performed truthfully and with sincerity, and in an appropriate context. Promises or apologies which are false or insincere do not meet the performance criterion: both are better described as lies. Teng's admission of mistakes and the apology he offered in these two examinations do raise issues about the sort of speech act he was performing, and whether he had actually fulfilled the criterion for it. In this context, the performance of an `apology' speech act was framed by expectations of how the apology should be said, to whom, and through which language. When Teng talked in these speeches of having `anguished feelings' he expressed this by the use of a saying (chengyu) that is to say, through a cliche (wanfen chengtong). And he apologised not to specific individuals, at this stage, but toward generalities `the great mass of people', organisations and large entities.
The act that Teng was performing also signified something about the new situation in which he was placed, and its impact on how he could exercise power and authority. Like a judge declaring a sentence, but this being meaningful only when there are institutions to implement this sentence, Teng's previous discourse had been possible in a context in which he occupied formal positions of authority in IMAR, where the Centre's support for him was clearly signified, serving to legitimise his authority. This illustrates the importance of social context in both creating and supporting the authority claims in discourse. In the new situation, Teng's words had no illocutionary force because this context had been removed. He could no longer speak as the head of anything, but only as an individual who had made mistakes.
Teng's `apology' can also be seen as an act of negotiation as much as one of contrition. He was performing to two audiences: the Centre, to whom he needed to demonstrate obedience, and to negotiate forgiveness to maintain his capital with them; and the local audience, to whom he had to act as the main fall guy for the recent failed campaign, accepting blame on behalf of the Centre without giving the impression he was apologising in their place for mistakes their instructions had inspired. Teng's apology functioned as part of a negotiation with these two separate parties. In both cases, it was to perform damage limitation to admit mistakes as far as possible, but not in such a way that the credibility of the Centre was challenged, and to maintain the best chance of him emerging from the process still able to work for the Centre. His apology was not an abnegation of power, a removal and disassociation from it. In fact, Teng's apology was an act to manage the destruction and damage that the previous failed paradigms and narratives had led to.
The keywords in Teng's speeches for the admission of culpability were `mistake' (cuowu), `crime'(zui) and the associated `confess/own up to having committed a crime (renzui or qingzui), `letting down' (duibuqi) and `sorry' (baoqian). The final term, `sorry,' is the one that depends most on an individual performing the speech act in a specific context to be meaningful. At one stage on the 23rd June, Teng directly apologised to Gao Jinming, who had been his deputy until early 1969 when a mini-campaign had led to his temporary removal as someone who was politically unreliable. On the 18th June, towards the end of his examination, he offered a series of personal apologies to named comrades in specific work units, in a highly formal manner - `zengli daoqian.' Such apologies to specific individuals culminated in the final apology: `I have let down the rebellious factions of IMAR, I say to the revolutionary groups of the whole region I am most deeply sorry.'
Teng admitted earlier in this examination that he had not understood or appraised the situation in IMAR properly: `Under the development of my leftist?tendency thinking, I believed that the Party rectification campaign in IMAR had not been done thoroughly, that it needed to continue, from the beginning of the Party rectification campaign, I continuously opposed rightism. At the end of 1968, Teng stated that he had been given material showing that the IMPP had 60 sections, and 12 party committees. `I believed this,' he said, `but in fact this material was all extracted under pressure and torture. It was this issue of the physical suffering of the Party members and others in IMAR accused of being IMPP which most aroused the audience's anger. Teng's breaching of his responsibility for this, and his apology, along with any explanation for its causes, is worth quoting at length:
`All of the people of IMAR, all of the cadres, love Chairman Mao, are faithful to him, faithful to his Thought, and limitlessly love Chairman Mao's line. The sky of IMAR is Chairman Mao's sky, the earth is the earth of his Thought. Because of the mistake of my serious leftist?tendencies the feelings and trust of the great mass of the people of IMAR towards Chairman Mao has been shaken. This evil is very serious. Because of this mistake, many of our cadres have suffered. We still don't have a final figure. If we say in the whole region that 100,000 people have suffered from being dug up as IMPP, that is still 100,000 people. If there are five people in each household [these victims come from], it doesn't matter if we say we've dug 100,000, 200,000, several hundred thousand, this isn't a problem of giving or taking a few hundred thousand, this is thousands of people politically being struck, with their families, their children, their relatives, all of them receiving political damage. This destroys the relations between national groups, and relationship of those above and below. For this crime you can't use figures and numbers, or economics, no numbers can reflect it. The most serious thing is that, of our national minority cadres, in some work units 80% of these have been labelled IMPP, and in some others 100%. And there are others that say that our great leader Chairman Mao is not the leader of the Mongolians, [that] the leader of the Mongolians is Ulanfu. This completely slanders our national minorities and the great revolutionary mass of the Mongolians.?
Teng's new discourse allowed public admission that Mongolians had suffered in the CR, but control was still signified over this deeply sensitive part of the discourse by the failure to articulate reasons for why they had suffered. The Centre's policy of `unity' between all groups was still asserted as paramount, its value unaffected by the recent events in IMAR waged to defend the same concept of unity. Teng's `apology' was a political act, connected as much to the promotion of central interests in the IMAR as had his previous prescriptive language. It was an act to control the accepted bounds of discourse, and then negotiate. He admitted to this situation in IMAR being caused by `my leftist tendencies.' But he did not go beyond this. Even the audience's goading did not prompt him to ask what `specific' feature of IMAR he had so badly misunderstood. As in previous terms of discourse used in the CR in IMAR, his apology was aimed at foreclosing certain lines of enquiry and blocking others off. His prime objective, as in many apologies, was to appease the receiver, the audience, to satisfy at least their most urgent needs for rectification, so that their anger did not push the movement in directions that were not desired. His role was that of a scapegoat, and his activity still to deliver control to control the discourse of anger and attrition so that it did not stray towards the most sensitive sources of grievance and hurt.
This was most evident in the final apology that Teng offered in two of his examinations. On the 18th June his apology was finally to specific individuals and groups, to named entities, to people of the IM Teachers College like Ding Keming, to all the `revolutionary rebellious factions in the region,' to the `workers propaganda groups' and the `army propaganda groups'(junxuandui), culminating in an apology to `the IMAR proletarian revolutionary factions,' and to the `great masses of the IMAR revolutionary factions, and to the rebels of IMAR.' The final arbiter in this hierarchy of power was the `13 million people of IMAR,' to whom he `acknowledges mistakes, and admits culpability'(ditou renzui). The apology on 23rd June was more in terms of the acts that Teng accused himself of committing:
`The evil consequences of the mistakes I have committed?have destroyed the three unities of the revolution, and the great unity of the revolutionary masses, destroyed the unity between national minorities, and between the army and the government, and the cadres and people, disturbing the great strategy and measures of Chairman Mao, setting back the criticism, struggle and reform process in IMAR, seriously influencing agricultural and industrial productivity.
The disruptions and interruptions in these examinations showed the dynamics between Teng's voice and the people he spoke to. Teng may have been apologising but he was still talking on behalf of, and with the protection, of larger powers, those at the Centre, who had sent him to this place about which he knew almost nothing, and to whom he had constantly answered. His apology was part of a process which had been ongoing since the start of the CR - how to handle the problem of IMAR, how to manage and control it according to the template given by the Centre. His failure to indicate any recognition of the unique ethnic element in IMAR showed his discourse excluding the thing that was most important.
This element was not only excluded by him but also by the audience. In Teng's examination, the audience never pressed him on it. Their questions concerned numbers, whether there was or was not an IMPP, but it never got close to the deeper question of why this movement against a `counter-party' should have effected so many Mongolians. The main function of his apology therefore was to ensure that the specific power structures he had worked on behalf of were not affected or damaged by the ill advised policy that had been implemented in IMAR since 1967 and the Centre's main interventions. His apology was structured to maintain the very forces and ideas for which, ostensibly, he was apologising. His reward was to be taken from IMAR at the end of 1969, to undergo a process of re-education in Tangshan, Hebei, and be posted to Jinan, northeast China from 1975 to 1980 as Deputy Military Commander. By 1980 however his position was untenable (due to the trials of others, particularly the Gang of Four implicated in the CR) and he retired, to die in Beijing in 1997. He was never formally held accountable for what had occurred in IMAR during his tenure there, and was spared a trial due to his impeccable credentials before 1967, and protection from the Centre.
Conclusion: Saying Sorry and Staying in Power
In this final stage of the CR campaign in IMAR, the language used indicated a dramatic shift from the exercise of power through categorical statement and prescription to the strategic use of submissiveness, admissions of guilt and mistakes. In this new context, there was a new market of forces, new values and priorities, with the symbolic capital and credibility of certain figures like Teng re-evaluated, and their rights to use certain kinds of language removed. This was paralleled by the creation of a further, new raft of organisations and institutions, parasitical in their turn on those created earlier in the CR, but now working in the new narrative to attack Teng.
This new stage of the CR discourse reveals one thing: that while there could be flexibility about certain figures and their values, the primary areas maintained their value. In the new discourse, the symbolic capital of Mao, and the Centre, was not up for negotiation, and remained the dominant currency. The most sensitive areas (of ethnicity and nationality) were left untouched in this discourse. A new narrative accommodating Mongolian grievances was structured in such a way that while there were open admissions of Mongolian casualties, this was not imputed to the Centre's policies asserting the hegemony of class over national minorities.
Underlying Teng's apology was the importance of maintaining this credibility of the Centre. His performance was more in the nature of a sacrifice, on behalf of the larger powers who he served. The voice of one of these, Kang Sheng, when he met with the IMAR group during the Ninth Party Congress on 7th April made this clear: `I have not seen you for two years and am not clear about the situation in IMAR.' But the Centre had one proclamation to make through Kang:
`The class struggle and Party rectification in IMAR has been successful, it's the main current, and is good. But we need to understand, Chairman Mao has taught us, never to forget class struggle. We need to do class struggle properly, we need to grasp policy. Policy is the fate of the Party. If we don't grasp policy, we can't do things thoroughly, things become chaotic. The majority of Mongolians in IMAR are good. Spies, Mongolian traitors, the landlords, rich, counter-revolutionaries and bad are the minority?You need to have faith that the majority of Mongolian cadres are good, or relatively good. You don't need to say every time a Mongolian cadre makes a mistake it means they are IMPP? That's impossible, impossible.'
In the end, this was a sentence upon Teng, the indication of removal of support. The Centre was now the supporter of moderation, fairness to all national minority groups. And Teng, from being the chief prosecutor from 1967 to early 1969, had, by mid 1969, become a new type of enemy. The issue of the political sensitivity of saying sorry, and how to say sorry, continues to this day, with a full account and rectification of the CR in IM still being awaited.
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